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1.  The Linguistic Spectrum  
 
Languages form a spectrum from having fewer to more gender-specific terms. 
On one end of the spectrum we have languages like Hebrew. As Ilana Masad 
explained in an article on The Toast, in Hebrew “one cannot speak in the first- or 
second-person without indicating gender. The word ‘I’ is ungendered, but any 
verb connected to it in present or future tenses is gendered. Thus the phrase, “I 
want a cookie” becomes, in literal translation, “I female-want a female-cookie”.”1  
On the other end of the spectrum, we have languages like Finnish, which does 
not have grammatical gender or any gender-specific pronouns.  
Somewhere between Finnish and Hebrew, we find English.2 Certain parts of 
speech in English are gender-specific—for instance, singular third-person 
pronouns (he and she). This makes English more gendered than languages like 
Finnish. But first- and second-person pronouns (I and you), and the verbs 
connected to them, are gender-neutral in English, which makes English less 
gendered than languages like Hebrew.   
 
* Authors are ordered alphabetically, and are equally responsible for the content. They would like 
to thank Emma Marja Atherton, Sukaina Hirji, Matthew McKeever, Andrea Pitts, Michael Rae, 
Kevin Timpe, the editors, and of course Nala and Eli.  
1 Ilana Masad, ‘On Hebrew and Living in Gendered Language’, The Toast, March 17 2015 
<http://the-toast.net/2015/03/17/hebrew-living-gendered-language/> 
2 We use this comparison following Guiora (1983: 231): “We can summarize the differences in the 
extent to which these languages obligate speakers and addressees to note their own and others’ 
gender by saying that the sex-determined grammatical “gender loading” of languages varies 
from almost zero in languages like Finnish and Hungarian, through very low in English, to very 
high in Hebrew.” Note that languages like Finnish, though often classified as ‘genderless’, still 
have some gendered terms.  
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The central question we explore is: Where on this spectrum should English be? 
As English speakers, should we collectively push our language to be more or less 
gendered? 
Of course, English could be exactly where it ought to be on this spectrum. But 
in a way, that would be surprising. Languages shift along this spectrum as a 
result of changes in how we write and speak.3 Why think English now happens 
to get things exactly right?  
There are related questions for non-English languages, of course. And people 
take them seriously. Masad goes on to describe subtle forms of activism that 
Israeli feminists and LGBTQIA communities have engaged in—often deliberately 
flouting the rules set by the Academy of Hebrew Language—such as mixing up 
gender-specific verbs (“I am male-going to the gallery and female-buying art”). 
We focus on the English case because that’s what we know. However, at least 
prima facie, arguments in this context should generalize to other languages: if you 
think English is currently as gendered as it ought to be, there’s some pressure to 
think that Finnish should be more gendered and Hebrew should be less gendered, 
though that pressure is of course defeasible.4  
Our view is that English should be no more gender-specific than it is currently race-
specific with respect to four parts of speech: pronouns, honorifics, suffixes, and 
generics. (We’ll discuss other forms of gendered and racially coded language in 
Section 5). Exactly what this means will become clear in a moment, but for now 
we can say that it would make English far less gendered even than languages 
like Finnish. We conclude by considering reasons for and against de-gendering 
English further still.  
 
2. The Analogy to Race-Based Language  
 
It can be hard to evaluate gendered practices in which we’re enmeshed; 
sometimes we need to get some distance. One way to do this is to consider 
hypothetical languages that treat some other social category the exact same way 
English currently treats gender. We will pursue this using an analogy between 
gender- and race-specific language from Douglas Hofstadter’s ‘A Person Paper 
 
3 An interesting case is the introduction of gender-specific third-person pronouns in Chinese in 
the 20th Century, and recent efforts to revert back to gender-neutral pronouns. See Victor Mair, ‘A 
Gender-Neutral Pronoun (Re)Emerges in China’, Slate 12/26/2013. Thanks to Esther Klein, we 
have also learned of efforts to introduce gender-specific second-person pronouns in written 
Chinese in Taiwan.  
4 For example, it may be that there are moral reasons to preserve highly gendered indigenous 
languages in their current form. Our thanks to Andrea Pitts for helpful discussions of this issue.  
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on Purity in Language’,5 though as we discuss later, we have some general and 
specific reservations about this strategy.  
Hofstadter imagines a world with race-specific English terms (hereon 
`Renglish’) that corresponds to the actual world’s gender-specific English terms. 
Writing in the voice of “William Satire”—a fictional person whose name, prose, 
and arguments resemble those of the columnist William Safire—Hofstadter 
considers the “negrists” who would eliminate certain race-specific terms and 
thereby “radically change our language in order to "liberate" us poor dupes from 
its supposed racist bias.” These terms fall into four categories, which have 
gender-specific counterparts in English. 
 
 Renglish English 
Pronouns whe; ble he; she 
Honorifics Master; Niss Mister; Miss 
Suffixes -oon -ess 
Generic terms whiteslaughter manslaughter 
 
First, we have third-person pronouns. Satire describes “shrill objections” from a 
black activist “to the age-old differentiaton of whites from blacks by the third-
person pronouns ‘whe’ and ‘ble’.” This activist, Satire writes, argues that a single 
third-person pronoun should be used for “both” races—an idea Satire finds 
absurd.6 The fictional practice Satire describes corresponds to gendered third-
person pronouns. Just as whe and ble mark white and black in Satire’s English, 
our actual use of he and she mark male and female.7 Moreover, just like Satire’s 
activist, we have elsewhere defended the idea that a single third-person pronoun 
should be used for everyone, regardless of gender.8  
 
5 Hofstadter (1985: 159-172). 
6 Note that Hofstadter, no doubt intentionally, has Satire assume that race is a strict binary. 
7 There is considerable debate over the semantics of gender terms ‘woman’ and ‘man’, which we 
take to be relevant for the semantics of gender-specific terms like ‘he’ or ‘Ms.’ (Though strictly 
speaking, gender-specific pronouns take the relevant gender information as a presupposition: see 
Heim and Kratzer (1998), ch. 5 and 9). In particular, there is disagreement concerning when (if at 
all) gender terms mark biological features, gendered social roles, or internal gender identities. We 
remain neutral on this debate, as we do not think any proposed semantics will escape the worries 
we here raise for gender-specific terms.  For further reading on the semantics of gender terms, see 
Bettcher (2013), Saul (2012), and Diaz-Leon (2016).  
8 See Dembroff & Wodak (2018). Again, we remain neutral here as to whether gender is best 
understood in terms of identity, biology, social position, or something else. 
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Second, we have honorifics. Here’s how Satire discusses complaints against 
three race-specific (and gender-neutral) honorifics in Renglish, ‘Master’, ‘Niss’, 
and ‘Nrs.’:  
 
Nrs. Delilah Buford has urged that we drop the useful distinction between 
‘Niss’ and ‘Nrs.’ […]. Bler argument is that there is no need for the public 
to know whether a black is employed or not. Need is, of course, not the 
point. Ble conveniently sidesteps the fact that there is a tradition in our 
society of calling unemployed blacks ‘Niss’ and employed blacks ‘Nrs.’ 
[…] Nrs. Buford refuses to recognize this simple truth. Instead, ble shiftily 
turns the argument into one about whites, asking why it is that whites are 
universally addressed as ‘Master’, without any differentiation between 
employed and unemployed ones.9  
 
Here again, Renglish corresponds to English. English honorifics ‘Mrs.’ and ‘Miss’ 
indicate the marital status of women, while men are universally addressed as 
‘Mr.’. (We now have an honorific for women that does not disclose marital 
status, ‘Ms.’. We’ll discuss it later.) And in both cases these honorifics encode a 
binary: between men and women (Mister/Ms.) or between whites and blacks 
(Master/Ns.). 
Third, we have suffixes. Satire describes the “time-honored colored suffixes 
‘oon’ and ‘roon’, found in familiar words such as ambassadroon, stewardoon, 
and sculptroon”.10 This corresponds to how suffixes like ‘ess’ and ‘ress’ are used 
in English, which aren’t employed as profligately as before (it is now rarer to talk 
of Emily Dickinson as a poetess, rather than a poet), but are still commonly used 
in familiar words such as ‘actress’ and ‘waitress’.  
Finally, we have generic terms. Linguistically, this is a somewhat 
miscellaneous category. In Satire’s language, it includes compound nouns 
(chairwhite, mailwhite, repairwhite, clergywhite, middlewhite, Frenchwhite, forewhite) 
and verbs (whiteslaughter, whitehandle) that use white generically for all persons. 
Some uses of the term white are similar: “All whites are created equal” in the 
Declaration of Independence, and in “One small step for a white, a giant step for 
whitekind” as said by the first person on the moon. These race-specific terms 
have obvious counterparts in the ‘masculine generics’ in English.11  
 
 
9 Hofstadter (1985: 159). 
10 Hofstadter (1985), p. 162. 
11 For discussion, see Menegatti and Rubini (2017). 
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We think Hofstadter’s analogy elicits the intuition that English should be no 
more gender-specific than it is currently race-specific with respect to these parts 
of speech. That is, just as we do not have these distinct race-specific pronouns 
(“whe”), generic terms (“chairwhite”), honorifics (“Nrs”) and suffixes (“-oon”) in 
English, we should not have their gender-specific equivalents. 
Hofstadter’s intent in writing the piece was to support just this view. Indeed, 
he came close to making this point explicitly when he wrote, in the voice of 
Satire:  
 
One of the more hilarious suggestions made by the squawkers for this point 
of view is to abandon the natural distinction along racial lines, and to replace 
it with a highly unnatural one along sexual lines. One such suggestion—
emanating, no doubt, from the mind of a madwhite—would have us say "he" 
for male whites (and blacks) and "she" for female whites (and blacks). Can 
you imagine the outrage with which sensible folk of either sex would greet 
this "modest proposal"? 
 
We think the intuition that Hofstadter’s analogy elicits is exactly right. Our goal 
will be to diagnose what would be wrong about the use of race-specific terms in 
Renglish, and note that the same considerations carry over to gender-specific 
terms in English.  
But as we noted above, we have some reservations about this argument by 
analogy. A general reservation about analogies between race and gender is that 
these social identities aren’t completely separable;12 they intersect. A similar 
point holds for gender- and race-specific terms. For example, as Duvall (2008) 
notes, honorific-plus-name variations were used in the South in the 20th Century 
to mark the gender and race of both the speaker and subject. A white man named 
John Smith would be called “Mr. Smith” by other white adults, but “Mr. John” 
by children and African Americans. A white woman named Jane Smith would be 
called “Mrs. Smith” by white adults, and “Miss Jane” by children and African 
Americans. And African American adult called John would be called “John” or 
“boy”, not “Mr. Smith”, by white adults. It was not until Hamilton v. Alabama in 
(1964) that the US Supreme Court held that African Americans had the right to 
be addressed in court by the same gender-specific honorifics as whites.13  
Another reservation is that, while Hofstadter’s hypothetical is framed as a 
distant possibility, there are relevantly similar instances of race-specific language 
 
12 See King 1988; Spelman 1988; Carastathis 2008; Mouffe and Laclau 1985.  
13 There are also more subtle ways in which ways narrative constructions, rather than 
gender/race-specific terms, indicate gender and race. See, e.g., Bucholtz (2011). 
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in English, including uses of the race-specific suffix ‘-oon’.14 (There are also, of 
course, plenty of examples of less relevantly similar but still significant race-
specific terms, such as racial slurs and racially coded words, in English.) Given 
these reservations, and the differing genealogies and social meanings of actual 
race and gender categories, some might resist Hofstadter’s analogy. In particular, 
some might think that Hofstadter relies upon intuitions problematizing race-
specific terms that are not translatable or comparable to the intuitions 
problematizing gender-specific terms.15  
On this issue, we think the devil is in the details: we think the best way to tell 
whether the analogy works is to explore whether the considerations against race-
specific terms actually do apply to gender-specific terms. We take up that task in 
the next section. But if our discussion there isn’t sufficient to assuage this 
concern, we think similar arguments by analogy could be made between gender-
specific terms in English and hypothetical languages that marked other social 
identities, such as weight, class, or disability.16 While we acknowledge the 
significant differences between these social identities, we think similar moral 
concerns arise when languages embed these identities into their very grammar in 
the way that English currently embeds gender.  
 
3. What’s Wrong with Gendered and Racialized Language? 
 
Intuitively, the actual English language should not become more racialized so as 
to mirror Renglish. But why, exactly? It is instructive to interrogate this intuition 
to see why Hofstadter’s analogy between racialized and gendered language 
withstands scrutiny. We think there are three main factors that explain why it 
would be wrong to make English more racialized, and these same factors also 
explain why the actual gendered equivalents of this racialized language are also 
wrong.  
 
3.1 Stigma and Stereotypes 
  
The first reason concerns how language stigmatizes and stereotypes social groups.17  
 
14 Haslanger (2005: 11) has some examples: ‘quadroon’, ‘octoroon’. However, ‘-oon’ is rarely a 
race-specific suffix in English; it typically occurs in words borrowed from Romance languages 
(e.g. ‘balloon’). 
15 See Mayeri (2000: 1045) for related arguments against analogies between race and gender in 
legal contexts. We’d like to thank Andrea Pitts for helpful discussions here.  
16 See our example of weight-specific third-person pronouns in Dembroff and Wodak (2018: 398). 
17 One relevant notion of ‘stigma’ loosely tracks Iris Marion Young’s (2004) notion of being subject 
to “cultural imperialism”. Groups subject to cultural imperialism, according to Young, when they 
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Renglish stigmatizes blacks in part by making ‘white’ the generic term for all 
persons in phrases like ‘chairwhite’ and sentences like ‘All whites are created 
equal’: making ‘white’ the default treats non-whites as different, defective 
instances of persons. The same concern carries over to generic uses of ‘man’ for 
persons; indeed, feminist philosophers have long objected to generic uses of ‘he’ 
and ‘man’ in English.18 Similarly, having honorifics that communicate 
employment status for blacks but not for whites communicates that employment 
is central to the identity of blacks but not whites, and the same holds for 
honorifics that communicate marital status for women but not men.  
Some might object, at this point, that race- and gender-specific terms need not 
have these stigmatizing effects. We can have such terms without making ‘white’ 
and ‘man’ the default; we can have race-/gender-specific honorifics that don’t 
encode information about employment or marital status for blacks/women but 
not whites/men. So why not keep gender-specific language while also ensuring 
parity between male- and female-specific language—keeping the genders 
separate but equal, as it were? 
We have three responses to this objection. First, note that it already requires 
some important changes to English and Renglish. It would require, for example, 
shifting to race- and gender-neutral alternatives to terms like whiteslaughter or 
manslaughter.  
Second, even if white- or masculine-specific terms are not the default, there 
are reasons to think keeping races and genders separate is almost inevitably 
unequal. Consider the diminutive suffix -ess, and its counterpart in Renglish, -
oon. Even if the neutral (white/masculine) steward was not the default, stewardess 
and stewardoon are likely to remain objectionable. As feminists and linguists have 
noted for a long time, terms referring exclusively to women (e.g., spinster) that 
are the counterparts to neutral masculine terms (e.g., bachelor) acquire pejorative,  
trivializing, sexualizing, or in some other way subordinating meanings.19 Indeed, 
the linguist Chi Luu (2017) argues that gender-specific honorifics also mark 
respectability status: for example, while a male President is called “Mr. 
 
are “defined from the outside” by stereotyped and inferiorized images, and so construed as 
“others”. We think this notion applies to groups that are treated as abnormal/defective by 
standard generics.   
18 Adele Mercier (1995), for example, argues that regardless of speaker intention, masculine 
generics are not gender-neutral, as they cannot be used to refer exclusively to women. Others, 
such as Horn and Kleinedler (2000) argue that masculine generics should not be used because 
they suggest that “normal” or typical humans are male. For further references, see Menegatti and 
Rubini (2017).   
19 See e.g. Lakoff (1973), Spender (1985), Baker (1992).  
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President”, a female President is not called the linguistic counterpart “Mrs. 
President,” but rather is called “Madame President.” Luu draws from this that 
“Mrs.” is not simply the gendered counterpart of “Mr.”, but also encodes a 
degraded respectability status. Mutatis mutandis, we expect, for racial terms in 
Renglish.   
Third, even if gender-specific language were used equally without 
stigmatizing connotations, this will not avoid the stereotyping effects of gender-
specific language.20 A considerable amount of evidence supports the 
(“Whorfian”) hypothesis that how we use language affects how we think in 
general, and how we use gendered language affects how we think about gender 
in particular.21 Many have argued that grammatical gender has pernicious effects 
on sexist practices and attitudes.22 There are also theoretical reasons to expect 
such results. Consider Renglish once more. If the most natural ways of referring 
to someone who writes would include information about their race (ble, 
authoroon), this would implicitly communicate that their race is important to their 
work.23 Of course, sometimes one’s race is relevant. But it’s not always relevant – 
or, at least, not relevant to the extent that it calls for specific marking. And 
building racial classifications into pronouns and nouns this way makes it seem 
distinctly relevant to all and sundry features of social life. The parallel to gender-
specific pronouns and suffixes should be clear. (For example, see Frye (1983: 22) 
on how English grammar requires one to reveal the author’s gender to review 
‘his’ or ‘her’ book.) Building social identities into the very grammar of the 
language communicates that the social identity in question is always relevant to 
explaining everything one does, and thereby helps to transmits essentialist views 
about social identities.24  
 
20 While there is debate over the best way to characterize stereotypes, for our purposes it is 
sufficient to recognize, following Beeghly (2015), that stereotypes “make generic claims about 
social groups”.  
21 For a recent example, see Sato and Athanasopoulos (2018: 220-231): an object’s grammatical 
gender categorization impacts cognition by influencing “conceptual gender” expectations about 
the object. For an even more recent example, see Tavits and Pérez (2019: 16781-16786): the use of 
gender-neutral pronouns “reduces the mental salience of males”, which in turn is associated with 
more positive public attitudes toward females and LGBTQ persons.  
22 See, e.g., Stahlberg et al., (2007); Wasserman and Weseley (2009): pp. 634-643. 
23 One way to understand the mechanism of this implicit communication is via Grice’s maxim of 
“relation”, which says that one should say things that are relevant to the discussion. For those 
who worry about this appeal to Gricean maxims, though, see Burnett (2017) and Khoo (2017) for 
alternative mechanisms that convey social meaning regardless of speaker intention.  
24 See e.g. Taylor (2013: 89): ‘the failure of classical racialism means that “because they’re black” is 
no longer an explanation for anything. It becomes, instead, a gesture at a request for an 
explanation’. Marilyn Frye (1983: 19-23) makes a similar point about gendered language. 
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3.2 Exclusion 
 
The second reason concerns who is excluded by Renglish. Renglish encodes the 
racial binary of white and black into the grammar of the language. What pronouns 
or suffixes or honorifics would Satire use for East Asians, or Native Americans, 
or Pacific Islanders? With only “whe” and “ble” as options, speakers must either 
treat Asians as if they are either white or black. Either way, they are 
misrepresented.25  
Those who are neither white nor black are not the only people excluded by 
the binary. It would also face difficulties with people with both black and white 
ancestry.26 Would someone with one black great-grandparent be called “ble”, in 
keeping with the one-drop rule? Or would they be called “whe”, thereby erasing 
their black ancestry?  
The basic problem is that Renglish treats racial categories as binary, 
exhaustive, and mutually exclusive, whereas many philosophers of race have 
long noted that there is a “continuous spectrum of varying morphological traits” 
(Mills 2000: 47).27 One might think the solution is to add racialized pronouns and 
suffixes and honorifics. But we think the solution is to have much less racialized 
language, not much more. To avoid misrepresenting anyone we’d need an 
awfully large number of new distinct pronouns, suffixes, and honorifics. But 
proliferating race-specific language is doomed to fail. Pronouns, in particular, are 
“closed class” terms, or cognitively primitive terms that can function as 
shorthand for any person, thing, or concept.28 The problem is not that we cannot 
learn closed class terms. Children do, as do those learning foreign languages. The 
problem is that new closed class terms are far more difficult to learn, and hence 
resistant to change. Proliferating new race-specific prepositions is infeasible.  
Why does infeasibility matter? For at least two reasons.29 First, infeasibility 
increases the risk of misrepresentation. Even the most conscientious individuals 
with all the resources to learn all of the appropriate pronouns and suffixes et al. 
would struggle to never deploy them inaccurately. We’d end up misrepresenting 
 
25 The focus on the white-black binary in American history has often been exclusionary to others. 
For example, the Mississippi Chinese were “[o]riginally classed with “blacks”, but now viewed as 
essentially “white”,” and still “burdened with an ambiguous racial identity” (Loewen 1988: 2).) 
26 In this respect, Renglish would entrench a general problem: that the “American biracial system 
does not permit the identification of individuals … as mixed race”, see Zack (1993: 4). 
27 Alcoff notes the ongoing “hegemony of the black/white binary in antiracist discourses” (2013). 
28 See, e.g., Munte et al. (2001). 
29 It may also be that “ought implies feasible” (see Southwood 2016), but we’re not relying on that 
here. 
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others’ racial identities too often. We should aim to adopt a disposition that 
minimizes the risk of even accidentally wronging others in this way. (Especially 
given that our mistakes are likely to be inequitably distributed.) Second, we 
shouldn’t just be concerned with what the most conscientious individuals should 
do. We should strive to change grammatical norms that shape the behavior of 
even the relatively unconscientious, the exhausted, the distracted, and the 
overwhelmed. An infeasible policy is unlikely to become a new norm, since it’s 
likely to be (known to be) habitually violated by so many of us so often. By 
contrast, a simple policy like ‘Use “they” for everyone’ is more likely to become a 
collective practice.  
Notice that all of these considerations carry over to gendered terms in 
English, which encode a binary between men and women: “he” and “she”, 
“Mister” and “Ms.”, “actor” and “actress”. This binary is not exhaustive or 
mutually exclusive. While “there are only two genders!” has become a rallying 
cry for some, we think it’s false. Some people identify as having no gender. Some 
identify as being fluid between the binary genders. Some identify as third 
gendered. English speakers currently misgender such individuals on a regular 
basis in what is arguably a form of unlawful discrimination.30 Just as women are 
rendered invisible by generic uses of ‘he’,31 non-binary people are rendered 
invisible by generic uses of ‘he or she’ that presuppose that this disjunction 
covers all persons.  
Perhaps you don’t think gendered English terms do or should pick out 
persons’ gender identities, and instead think they do and should be used as 
markers for reproductive traits. We won’t argue with you (at least, not here). 
Even if you don’t care about how people identify, and only care about their 
reproductive traits—e.g., chromosomes, gonads, genitalia—this position still will 
not justify retaining a binary set of gender-specific terms that function as 
euphemisms for reproductive traits. Given the non-trivial number of intersex 
conditions, there is little to no promise of finding any non-arbitrary standards 
that would divide biological traits neatly into two categories (male and female), 
much less categories that persons could be accurately sorted into based on 
appearance.32 In short, regardless of whether we interpret gender-specific 
language in terms of gender identity or reproductive features, a binary encoded 
within gendered language excludes and marginalizes those who do not fit that 
binary. (The same point also holds for gendered social roles: consider Hijras, 
 
30 See Jessica Clarke, (forthcoming): section III.B.3. 
31 See Saul and Diaz-Leon (2018), fn. 2, for discussion and references.  
32 See Mantañez, A. (2017) “Beyond XX and XY: The Extraordinary Complexity of Sex 
Determination. Scientific American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/beyond-xx-and-
xy-the-extraordinary-complexity-of-sex-determination/  
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Fa’afafine, and Khaniths). And this explains why the solution to generic uses of 
‘he’ is not to use ‘he or she’, just as the solution to generic uses of ‘whe’ would 
not be to use ‘whe or ble’: treating the disjunction as if it exhaustively covers all 
persons excludes those who do not fit into the binary.  
 
3.3 Disclosure and Privacy 
 
The third reason concerns dilemmas that Renglish and English generate. Imagine 
that you live in a society that speaks Renglish. One day at work, you are making 
small talk with a colleague when they ask you whether you have any summer 
vacation plans. You say you have a vacation planned with your partner. Your 
colleague responds using the wrong race-specific pronouns for your partner: 
they didn’t know that you’re in a mixed-race relationship. Perhaps you’d prefer 
to keep this private--you think it’s no one else’s business, and you’d rather not 
have to engage with those who think that mixed-race relationships are morally 
wrong or disgusting.33 But you’re in a bind. On the one hand, you could deceive 
your colleague by explicitly or tacitly affirming their inaccurate use of race-
specific pronouns for your partner. On the other hand, you could refer to your 
partner accurately, and thereby disclose your partner’s race and your mixed-race 
relationship. You might try a third option: avoiding race-specific language 
altogether. But given how pervasive race-specific terms are in Renglish, this 
requires awkward linguistic contortions—contortions that someone would only 
go through to try to hide the race of the person they were speaking about. Since 
the only reason to use such circumlocutions is to hide specific racial information, 
these contortions are likely to indirectly reveal that information anyway. 
An analogous situation is regularly experienced by those in non-heterosexual 
relationships due to gender-specific terms such as third-person pronouns in 
English. People often are faced with the decision to either deceive their 
interlocutor or disclose the gender of a partner.34 The point generalizes to other 
contexts where it may be inappropriate to reveal gender information: with job 
 
33 In a March 2018 YouGov poll, 17% of Americans said that they think interracial marriage is 
morally wrong 
(https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/y3tke5cxwy/econTabReport.
pdf p. 92). Previous research suggests that many Americans who explicitly say that interracial 
marriage is morally acceptable still have disgust reactions to interracial couples 
(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103116300555). We can compare this to 
the 32% of Americans who morally oppose same-sex marriage (http://www.pewforum.org/fact-
sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/). 
34 This situation is so common with respect to pronouns that it is popularly called ‘playing the 
pronoun game’ within LGBTQ communities. 
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applicants, for instance. Given that one is expected to use terms like “he” or 
“she”, “Mr.” or “Ms.” (or “Mrs.”) etc., one can either deceive others by using a 
misleading term, or disclose the subject’s gender directly by using an accurate 
term. Circumlocutions rarely avoid the problem.35   
Renglish and English put people in a bind: speakers must either deceive or 
disclose with regard to racial or gender information that they have legitimate 
reasons to want to keep private. This is particularly galling since we should have 
more control over whether, when, and where we reveal such information. 
Grammatical norms should not violate our privacy and autonomy. Importantly, 
this is not to suggest that English ought to be altogether race- or gender-blind 
(see section 5), but rather that speakers should not be forced to reveal or lie about 
others’ social identities when referring to them.  
Again, this point holds regardless of whether one understands gender in 
terms of self-identification or anatomy. You have every right to privacy and 
autonomy about what’s in your head and what’s between your legs; everyone 
who uses third-person pronouns to describe you isn’t entitled to know, or 
assume, information about either. Indeed, the point is arguably stronger if we 
think of gender in terms of reproductive features. It is at best inappropriate and 
arguably a form of sexual harassment to be forced to disclose or deceive others 
concerning one’s own or another’s genital status, much less to be forced to do 
constantly.36 But this is the fact of the matter in most contexts, where terms like 
‘she’ are code for ‘has-a-vagina’ and terms like ‘he’ are code for ‘has-a-penis’. 
Basic considerations of privacy weigh against using a language that forces us to 
perpetually communicate information about what’s between people’s legs while 
conversing.  
 
4.  Objections  
 
We’ve argued that English should be no more gendered than it currently is 
racialized with respect to pronouns, honorifics, suffixes, and generics. We 
proposed three considerations that explain why such racialized terms – and, we 
suspect, similar terms that strongly mark any social identity – is morally wrong, 
and argued that they also apply to the analogous gendered terms.  
 
 
35 So long as gender-specific terms are predominantly used and expected, avoiding this language 
pragmatically implicates that the speaker has a reason to hide the subject’s gender. The end result 
in most cases will be that the subject’s gender is, in the end, indirectly (and perhaps 
involuntarily) disclosed. 
36 Bettcher argues that this function of language is a form of sexual violence (2007: 43-65). 
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Some might remain unpersuaded. Why would that be? A few possibilities are 
worth considering. With each, it’s worth asking whether it provides a compelling 
reason to resist the analogy: that is, to hold that Renglish should not be highly 
racialized as it is, but English can remain analogously highly gendered.  
First, some might hold that Renglish is problematic because it is used to 
maintain an entrenched racial hierarchy, but English does not maintain a similar 
gender hierarchy between men and women because English-speaking countries 
are not very sexist.  
We don’t think that this is credible. From sexual harassment to the spate of 
violence from ‘incels’—not to mention the reactions justifying, victimizing, or 
excusing this behavior—there’s ample evidence of high levels of (often racially 
coded) misogyny in the English-speaking world (see especially Manne 2017 and 
hooks 1981). Indeed, we think the practice of using masculine terms as generic 
term for all persons wears its sexism on its sleeve, just as the practice of using 
‘white’ as a generic term for all persons would wear its racism on its sleeve: an 
egalitarian society would not have this practice.37 
Second, some might accept that sexism exists but deny that it provides a 
reason to eliminate gendered terms. Having a highly gendered English language 
is problematic only because it arises from and operates within sexist contexts. 
Since the real disease is the underlying sexism, the solution is to eliminate that, 
rather than its symptoms.  
We think this response is mistaken on several fronts. For one, it’s not true that 
highly gendered terms are problematic only because of sexism; just like highly 
racialized terms, they also exclude many and violate privacy and autonomy. For 
another, we argued that highly gendered language reinforces sexism.38 
“Language”, Wittig once argued, “casts sheaves of reality upon the social body, 
stamping it and violently shaping it;” and gendered languages like English and 
French “give way to a primitive ontological concept that enforces in language a 
division of beings into sexes” (1985: 4, 3). Among other things, gendered terms in 
English reinforce what Julia Serano calls ‘oppositional sexism’: the idea that male 
and female are “rigid, mutually exclusive categories.”39 Eliminating sexism may 
require eliminating some highly gendered terms; the latter are not a mere 
 
37 As Lakoff (1973: 78) argues, these gendered language discrepancies “exist in English for the 
same reason: each reflects…the difference between the role of women in our society and that of 
men.” We note this applies to trans/nonbinary persons as well. 
38 A similar point is made about the role of discourse in racializing individuals (often in racist 
ways) in Lo (2016). Notably, Lo is concerned with broader features of discourse than merely race-
specific terms. 
39 Serano (2007). 
 14 
symptom of the former. This becomes all the more obvious when we consider the 
role that gendered language plays in institutional decision-making.40 
Third, one could hold that while there are strong reasons to eliminate 
racialized and gendered terms in Renglish and English, they are outweighed by 
reasons to keep those terms in English. What might those reasons be?  
One possibility is that eliminating he and she would only reinforce the 
patriarchy: there is some evidence that gender-neutral references are by default 
categorized as male.41 But the same point applies to race-neutral references being 
by default categorized as white. If this is a good reason for English to remain as 
gendered as it is, it’s a good reason for it to become racialized like Renglish.  
Another possibility is that gender information is relevant for social 
coordination. One simple point is that gendered language helps us disambiguate. 
If we’re discussing Romeo and Juliet, using ‘he’ or ‘she’ would allow you to 
clearly refer to one character and not the other. A more complex observation is 
made by Cailin O’Connor using models of cultural evolution: groups using social 
categories such as gender to coordinate behavior (particularly labor-related 
behavior) are – at least initially – “more efficient and more successful” than 
groups that do not use these categories.42 So gender information can be useful.  
We don’t think this line is promising. For one, racial information can be 
equally useful, but this does not seem to provide a sufficient justification for 
Renglish to be racialized. When discussing Trump and Obama, William Satire 
could use ‘whe’ or ‘ble’ to clearly refer to one President and not the other. And 
O’Connor’s point isn’t specific to gender; it works for using social categories like 
gender in general. For another, it’s doubtful that this kind of usefulness 
outweighs the moral reasons against using such social categories to coordinate 
behavior. As O’Connor demonstrates, such divisions, even if intitially useful, 
facilitate the emergence of inegalitarian social systems that have “outcomes that 
look like discrimination, inequity, and distributional injustice” with “no 
beneficial function.” We think that language plays a key role in facilitating such 
inequalities. As Lakoff succinctly put it, “Language uses us as much as we use 
language.”43 In particular, gendered language reinforces separate, unequal roles 
for women and men,44 just as Renglish would plausibly reinforce separate, 
unequal roles for racial groups.  
 
40  For discussion, see Robin Dembroff, ‘The Non-Binary Gender Trap’, The New York Review of 
Books January 30, 2018. 
41 See, e.g., Engelberg: “androcentricity in a genderless language may even increase the lexical, 
semantic and conceptual invisibility of women” (2002: pp. 109-132, 128).  
42 O’Connor (forthcoming). 
43 Lakoff (1973), 45. 
44 See Lakoff (1973), pp. 75, 76.  
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Of course, there might be other benefits of retaining gender-specific pronouns 
et al.; for example, they allow for subversive uses that undermine sexist 
oppression. For example, when someone refers to god as “she”, discomfort felt 
by those expecting “he” can send a powerful challenge regarding their 
preconceptions about god and gender.  
It’s not clear that retaining gender-specific pronouns et al. is necessary for 
engaging in such sexist subversive speech. We can use other gender-specific 
terms for these ends (see further, Section V): e.g., rather than refer to god as 
“she”, one could refer to god as a “woman” or “mother”. (After all, we engage in 
subversive speech about many other social categories without the aid of 
category-specific pronouns and suffixes.) 
Moreover, we do not think that the benefits of retaining gendered pronouns 
et al. for subversive speech outweigh the costs of maintaining them. Consider an 
example of Hofstadter’s in Renglish: “I have seen [g]od, and guess what? Ble's 
female!” By using “ble” against a background assumption of god’s whiteness, the 
speaker uses a race-specific pronoun subversively. Weight-, age-, sexuality- or 
other identity-specific pronouns could be used in similarly subversive ways. We 
would not take such benefits to outweigh the costs of generally referring to 
persons using such pronouns. 
A final possibility is that gendered language is necessary for the visibility of 
trans men and women: gender-specific pronouns, suffixes and honorifics give 
trans men and women linguistics tools to communicate to others how they 
would like to be addressed, what gender-norms they consider relevant to them, 
and so on. Moreover, partly for these reasons, men and women often prefer to be 
referred to by gender-specific pronouns, and those preferences should be 
respected.45  
This objection is more compelling, but we don’t think it succeeds. Gender-
specific terms like pronouns, honorifics, and suffixes are not the only way to 
articulate one’s gender identity: trans men and women (and, indeed, everyone) 
can use regular nouns (‘man’/’woman’, ‘brother’/’sister’) as linguistic devices to 
communicate their gender identities in situations when they want to communicate 
those identities.46 This points to a benefit of our proposal. It gives everyone more 
 
45 One might also worry that female-specific terms play an important role in anti-sexist/feminist 
political movements (e.g., ‘Run like a girl’, ‘Herstory’, etc.). While flagging concerns about 
construing feminism as a female-specific movement, we are sympathetic with this point, and 
address it in Section 5. 
46 Some might think we can just use pronouns the same way: by default, use ‘they’ for everyone; 
but when you learn someone is (e.g.) a woman, switch to using ‘she’. We think this might be a 
practice we should follow en route to establishing a norm of using ‘they’ for everyone, but it’s a 
worse long-term goal. Briefly, it’s an unstable middle ground between the status quo and our 
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control over when and how they make their gender identities visible, as we saw 
in the argument about disclosure and privacy.  
Moreover, we doubt that there’s an asymmetry with racialized terms here. 
For instance, someone who is Afro-Caribbean might be consistently ‘read’ as 
black by whites, and wish to make their Hispanic identity more visible; having 
specific Hispanic pronouns, suffixes, and honorifics would be a potent linguistic 
tool here too. This may be a reason to have racialized pronouns et al., but we 
doubt that it outweighs the reasons against racializing English. Why think the 
case with gendered terms is different?  
Of course, one may grant that gendered and racialized terms stand or fall 
together, but still resist our view. Perhaps the intuition that Hofstadter’s analogy 
elicits is misleading. It may, for instance, be a result of framing a hypothetical 
language in a way that  spotlights the pernicious features of race-specific terms, 
but is silent about their significance with regard to visibility of and solidarity 
between minority racial groups.47  
Even if this response undermines Hofstader’s intuitions with respect to race-
specific terms, we don’t think it undermines our position with respect to gender-
specific terms. To show why, we’ll try a different way of addressing these 
objections to our key claim—that English should be far less gendered than it 
currently is—without relying on an analogy to Renglish. Recall the spectrum that 
languages form. If English should retain the gender-specific pronouns, 
honorifics, and suffixes it has in order to make people’s gender identities more 
visible, why not make English more gendered? If we need third-person pronouns 
to make gender more visible, why not say the same for first- and second-person 
pronouns too? Why not make English like Hebrew, such that one must say, e.g., 
“I female-want a female-cookie”? In other words: if English should be more 
gendered than it is currently racialized, why shouldn’t English be more gendered 
than it is currently gendered? We think, for instance, that we should adopt a 
gender-neutral singular third-person (like ‘they’ or ‘ze’) for everyone, in part 
because it would not misrepresent anyone’s gender.48 If one finds it objectionable 
that on this proposal third-person pronouns fail to represent people’s genders, 
 
proposal. For one, it retains the problem of either having only distinct pronouns et al. for women 
and men (which is inegalitarian) or having distinct pronouns et al. for every gender (which is 
infeasible). For another, many people’s linguistic dispositions with closed class words like 
pronouns are likely too inflexible: either they’ll often automatically use ‘she’ for those that they 
simply assume are women (as in the status quo), or they’ll continue automatically using ‘they’ for 
someone even after learning that this person is a woman.  
47 Thanks to Andrea Pitts for pushing this response in personal communication.  
48 There are exceptions here: ‘they’ can pragmatically implicate that the referent has a nonbinary 
gender identity. In such contexts, though, ‘they’ is not functioning as a gender-neutral pronoun. 
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why not also object that our current first- and second-person pronouns (‘I’ and 
‘you’) also fail to represent anyone’s genders?  
 
5. Where Are We to Stop? 
  
At one point, again in the voice of Satire, Hofstadter writes of an opponent of 
race-specific terms:  
 
Niss Moses would have us totally revamp […] language to suit bler 
purposes. If, for instance, we are to substitute "person" for "white," where 
are we to stop? If we were to follow Niss Moses' ideas to their logical 
conclusion, we would have to conclude that ble would like to see small 
blackeys and whiteys playing the game of "Hangperson" and reading the 
story of "Snow Person and the Seven Dwarfs.” And would ble have us 
rewrite history to say, "Don't shoot until you see the persons of their eyes"? 
Will pundits and politicians henceforth issue person papers? Will we now 
have egg yolks and egg persons?49  
 
Some of what Satire says here is sheer sophistry. ‘Egg whites’ does not include 
‘white’ as a racial term, any more than ‘manatee’ includes ‘man’ as a gender 
term.50 But ‘where are we to stop?’ is a serious question, because there are race-
specific terms (in English, and in Hofstadter’s story) other than the four 
categories we discussed above. And the same is true of gender-specific terms in 
English. For instance, there are generic nouns for gender groups (women, men), 
adjectives (masculine, feminine), and proper names (Anna, Ben). There are also 
terms that are ostensibly gender-neutral, but that, given their history and use, 
can be regarded as implicitly gender-specific (like pretty or handsome).51 Given 
what we have said about pronouns, honorifics, suffixes, and uses of gender-
specific terms as generics for all persons, should we also strive to rid English of 
all of these instances of gender-specific terms? Likewise, we can ask: if the race-
specific terms in Hofstadter’s hypothetical are objectionable, should we strive to 
rid the actual English language of all race-specific terms?  
 
49 This explains the joke in the title: ‘A Person Paper’.  
50 Though etymologically, ‘manatee’ comes from a Native American term meaning ‘breast, 
udder’.  
51 Beyond specific terms, there are numerous ways in which the structure of various discourses 
convey information about gender (as well as race, class, and other identities). It is an interesting 
question—and one we will not settle here—whether to interpret these discourses as ‘gender-
specific’ or as indirectly conveying gender information. 
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Some might think that our argument thus far commits us to opposing all 
gender-specific terms, and because this conclusion is objectionable (or even 
absurd), our argument must have gone wrong somewhere. In contrast, others 
might think that our argument commits us to opposing all gender-specific terms, 
and this is all well and good: all gender-specific terms should be rejected. We 
think both of these responses are too quick. Both fail to account for 
considerations of what linguistic features are changeable, and what features are 
needed for anti-sexism work.52 To illustrate, note that nothing about our view 
obviously condemns the term misogyny, even though it is transparently gender-
specific. We should keep this word because none of the arguments we appealed 
to in condemning gender-specific honorifics and pronouns apply to misogyny, 
and because we need the term misogyny in order to recognize and rectify 
injustices committed against women. It’s not objectionable, and it earns its keep. 
It is a substantive question, then, whether other gender-specific terms such as 
feminine are more like misogyny (which must be kept) or more like Misses or she 
(which should and we think can be scrapped). Moreover, here we think that 
analogies between gender-specific and other identity-specific terms, like race-
specific terms, are sure to break down. In order to resolve this question, we must 
look to the ways that gender-specific terms in particular socially function, and 
decide from there which terms are important for anti-sexist work.53 One way to 
go about this is to consider whether the arguments against Misses and she also 
show feminine to be objectionable, and if so, whether further considerations 
suggest that feminine earns its keep regardless. These considerations must be 
weighed with empirical input from linguists as to what mechanisms and targets 
for language change are realistic and effective. 
Our stance on this is that the arguments against terms like Misses do apply to 
certain uses of terms like men and women, or masculine and feminine. Those uses 
are objectionable and should be avoided, if possible. For instance, when ‘men and 
women’ or ‘ladies and gentlemen’ are used to address all persons, speakers thereby 
reinforce the traditional gender binary and render invisible non-binary persons. 
When speakers use masculine and feminine as if all persons will fall under one 
descriptor, they reinforce the rigid gender norms associated with this traditional 
gender binary. This is objectionable. So are uses of gendered terms, and 
gendered patterns of language use, that reinforce gender stereotypes, such as 
 
52 On the first point, see Lakoff (1973): “The linguist can suggest which linguistic disparities…are 
changeable…and can thus help the workers in the real world to channel their energies most 
constructively.” (76) 
53 The linguistic needs of anti-sexist work, including gender-based solidarity and visibility will 
not, we think, be interchangeable with the linguistic needs of, e.g., anti-racist, anti-abilist, or anti-
fatphobic work. 
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that of men as ‘agentic’ and women as ‘communal’,54 and of men as the norm.55 
But not all uses of man and woman or masculine and feminine are like this. For 
instance, uses of these nouns in relation to the gender pay gap are important in 
precisely the way that misogyny is important. And uses of these adjectives within 
technical terms like toxic masculinity (stereotypically abusive masculine gender 
norms) or facial feminization (a medical procedure that is part of trans medical 
care) are similar.  
Given this, we think that such gender-specific terms should be used less, and 
used with caution. But they should not be eliminated: so long as gender-based 
discrimination and prejudice exist, our ability to articulate it in its many 
manifestations—and to create gender-based solidarity with others—means that 
some gender-specific terms are necessary. But it’s crucial here that we can 
relatively easily use these terms less, and with caution, in a way that isn’t true of 
gender-specific terms that get encoded into grammar (he and she; ‘I female-want 
a female-cookie’). Once that happens, we lack the ability to use gender-specific 
terms only where appropriate and relevant, and avoid them without implying 
gendered information. That’s why we think English should eliminate some 
gender-specific terms, even if other gender-specific language that can be 
similarly problematic simply should be used with caution.  
Our response so far has focused on exclusion and stigma, but a similar point 
applies to privacy and autonomy. In a sense, gender-specific proper names might 
seem to rid someone of their privacy and autonomy. For instance, say you are 
communicating online, and have to disclose your proper name. If your name is 
‘Rachel’, this means implicitly disclosing that you are a woman. And since you 
may have good reason not to disclose your gender identity (without deception), 
this can be problematic. But notice that you can legally change your proper 
name, and you can also adopt a gender-neutral nickname (like ‘Ray’) without 
even filing paperwork. Unlike with pronouns, honorifics, adjectives, and so on, 
generally others do not simply assume one’s proper name based on one’s 
appearance, posture, or voice. We are authorities over our proper names: as a 
result, we have much more control over what this name will be. So perhaps there 
is some reason for parents to use gender-neutral names for their children, but it’s 
not decisive. Moreover, telling parents to pick a gender-neutral name can 
sometimes veer close to the objectionable demand that they Anglicize their child’s 
name. Consider Iceland, where most individuals can only have a patronym 
 
54 For a recent overview of the literature on gendered language and stereotypes, see Menegatti 
and Rubini (2017). See also Macaulay and Brice (1997). 
55 See Silveira (1980) and Hamilton (1991) on the widespread practice of using gender-neutral 
terms for men (e.g., doctor) and gender-specific terms for similarly situated women (e.g., 
‘woman’, ‘lady doctor’).  
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whereby the suffix ‘-son’ or ‘-dóttir’ (depending on the declared sex of the child) 
is added to the genitive form of the father's name. It's one thing for Icelanders to 
argue for Iceland to allow individuals to adopt gender-neutral hereditary 
surnames. But it’s another thing entirely for English speakers to demand that 
Icelandic immigrants do the same.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We live in a world saturated in both racial and gendered divisions. Our focus has 
been on just one place where attitudes about these divisions diverge: language. 
We suspect most everyone would be horrified at the idea of adding race-specific 
pronouns, honorifics, generic terms, and so on to English. And yet gender-
specific terms of the same sort are widely accepted and endorsed. We think this 
asymmetry cannot withstand scrutiny. We’ve provided three considerations 
against incorporating additional race-specific terms into English, and argued that 
these considerations also support eliminating the analogous gender-specific 
terms. With respect to these parts of speech, in short: English should be no more 
gender-specific than it already is race-specific.  
Should it not be gender-specific at all? We’ve suggested that, while we have 
good reason to massively pair down the number of gender-specific terms in 
English, we have further good reasons to preserve some gender-specific terms. 
Specifically, we suggested that some gendered terms are necessary in order to 
research, describe, and address gendered inequalities and experiences.   
Our present goal was to draw attention to and challenge the justification for 
maintaining a variety of gender-specific terms in the English language – terms 
that, to borrow Wittig’s words, “are instrumental in activating the notion of 
gender, [but] pass unnoticed” (1985: 5). We’ve focused on what we collectively 
ought to do: eliminate such terms, and make English less gendered. This leaves 
plenty of interesting and important questions about how we collectively and 
individually ought to act to realize this long-term goal. On this front, all we will 
say here is that we doubt there is much one-size-fits-all guidance that 
philosophers can provide. The history of advocacy for linguistic changes 
provides plenty of fruitful models. Sometimes change comes mostly from 
bottom-up activism, as with the adoption of an English honorific that does not 
disclose women’s marital status, ‘Ms.’, in the 1960s and 70s. Sometimes change 
comes mostly from top-down institutional reform, as with the Swedish 
Academy’s adoption of the gender-neutral pronoun ‘hen’ in 2014. So we leave 
the complex question of how to achieve this goal to future research, activists, 
institutions, and grassroots organizations. 
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